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INTRODUCTION
Careful analysis of the twenty-year-old federal experiment with structured
* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law. Many thanks to Marc Miller for his astute comments on an earlier
draft of this Article, to Kari Annand for her invaluable editorial suggestions, and to the staff
of the Stanford Law Review for their Herculean efforts in putting together this Issue.
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sentencing suggests one overriding conclusion about the design of sentencing
systems: a sentencing system that sensibly distributes power-both the power
to make sentencing rules and the power to determine sentences in particular
cases-among the institutional sentencing actors is likely to work pretty well.
Conversely, a system that concentrates sentencing power disproportionately in
the hands of one or even two institutional sentencing actors is headed for
trouble. The federal sentencing experience of the past three decades is a case
study in Madisonian political theory.' It demonstrates that a governmental
system that fails to erect a properly conceived set of checks and balances
against the inevitable tendency of political actors toward personal and
institutional self-aggrandizement is prone to degenerate into a despotism of the
most powerful branch or, as Madison particularly feared, into an alliance of two
branches against the third.2
The current federal sentencing regime, with its Sentencing Commission
and complex Guidelines, was intended to insulate the process of making
sentencing rules from the passions of politics. But as we will see, the architects
of the system miscalculated and created a sentencing structure almost perfectly
designed for capture and manipulation by the political branches. The existence
of this structure in combination with a variety of other factors has produced a
time machine. Not an H.G. Wells time machine that travels in the fourth
dimension, 3 but a machine whose only product is incarcerative time, a machine
controlled by a so-far indissoluble alliance between Congress and the Justice
Department.
In previous articles 4 I have analyzed the structural failures of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines system, particularly the imbalances it has created among
the primary institutional sentencing actors-Congress, the judiciary, the Justice
Department, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission-and have proposed a
1. I refer to the general theory of separation of powers between executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government championed by Montesquieu (among many others) and
refined by James Madison and other founders of the American Constitution into a system of
governmental checks and balances. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS 171 (Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1748); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
2. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) ("If the legislative
authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other
departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others," the third department
"could derive no advantage."). Madison discusses the prospect of an alliance of two
branches against the third in the particular context of Thomas Jefferson's proposal in "Notes
on the State of Virginia" that a new constitutional convention be called whenever two of the
three branches call for it. However, Madison's concern about an alliance of two branches is
more general and emerges throughout his discussion of the constitutional system of checks
and balances.
3. H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1898).
4. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1315 (2005) [hereinafter Bowman, Failure of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines].
[Vol. 58:235
HeinOnline  -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 236 2005-2006
MADISON MEETS A TIME MA CHINE
simplified guidelines system designed to address the current system's structural
flaws 5 and to be consistent with the Supreme Court's developing Sixth
Amendment jury trial jurisprudence. 6 However, neither a failure analysis nor
the prescription for a revised system is of much practical value unless these
institutions can interact in ways that will permit reform to occur. Consequently,
this Article considers the politics and political science of federal sentencing
reform.7 More particularly, it asks whether the twenty-first-century custodians
of Madison's eighteenth century model of government can use that model's
tools to disassemble the federal time machine and erect in its place a more
balanced and beneficent sentencing system.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. First, it sketches the constitutional
relationship between Congress, the judiciary, and the Department of Justice in
the field of criminal sentencing. Second, it describes the current state of federal
sentencing in terms of the relations between the primary institutional players,
with particular attention to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Booker declaring the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional as then
applied. Finally, it analyzes the prospects for significant positive change in the
near term and suggests a set of preconditions for improving those prospects.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BALANCE OF SENTENCING POWER
A. The Spheres of Congressional and Judicial Power in Federal Sentencing
The institutional actors in federal sentencing have at various times included
Congress, the judiciary, the Justice Department, the defense bar, the United
States Parole Commission, and the United States Sentencing Commission.
5. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond BandAids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal
Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Bowman,
Beyond BandAids], http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=721563 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2005).
6. The Supreme Court is in the midst of developing new Sixth Amendment doctrine
for the sentencing process. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (finding the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional as applied and invalidating sections of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to make the Sentencing Guidelines "effectively advisory");
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (striking down the Washington state
sentencing guidelines system as violative of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). For a
critique of the Blakely decision, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the
Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington,
41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2004).
7. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The
Political Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495 (2005)
[hereinafter Bowman, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values] (surveying the political
posture of sentencing reform in America generally).
October 2005]
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Only the first four have a constitutionally mandated permanent place in the
political calculus of sentencing, 8 and of the four permanent sentencing players,
only Congress and the federal judiciary have traditionally played a direct role in
making, interpreting, and implementing sentencing rules. For that reason, and
because tension between Congress and the federal judiciary is so obvious a part
of the current federal sentencing landscape, 9 I begin by considering the spheres
8. I count the Justice Department as having constitutional status only because it is the
organizational representative of the President whose constitutional duties include that "he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
I also include the defense bar in this group, but doing so is something of a stretch.
While defendants have a constitutional right to counsel in criminal prosecutions and are
customarily represented by lawyers at sentencing, the "defense bar" embraces a universe of
organizations and individual practitioners with virtually no consistent institutional presence
in the sentencing process and no direct say in sentencing rulemaking.
One might categorize the jury as a separate constitutionally mandated institutional
federal sentencing actor. After all, in a case tried to a jury, its decisions either determine (in
capital cases) or influence (in noncapital cases) the sentence the defendant will receive.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jury trial decisions from Apprendi
to Booker suggest that juries should play a more prominent role in finding facts
determinative of sentencing. Nonetheless, this Article does not treat the jury as a significant
institutional actor in the current federal sentencing debate. First, more than 95% of all federal
cases are resolved by plea. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 26 tbl. 11 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK] (showing 95.7% of all sentenced federal defendants pled guilty). Hence, juries
are not involved in very many federal cases. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-
Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001).
Second, juries are not repeat players in the criminal system. "The jury" in the abstract may
be involved in multiple cases, but each jury is an ad hoc assembly gathered for one case and
permanently disbanded at its conclusion. Third, except in capital cases, federal jurors do not
themselves impose or even recommend sentences; they find facts that may have a bearing on
sentencing, but are denied any information about the sentencing consequences of their
choices. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (finding that where a jury
has no sentencing role, providing sentencing information "invites [jurors] to ponder matters
that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and
creates a strong possibility of confusion"). They also may be instructed by the judge not to
take sentencing into account in reaching their verdicts. See United States v. McDonald, 620
F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1980) (approving instruction that the question of punishment "should
never be considered by the jury in any way" in deciding the case). Finally, juries are wholly
uninvolved in the rulemaking stage of the sentencing process, which is the focus of this
Article.
9. The most notable recent example of this tension is the passage of the Feeney
Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat 650 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Feeney Amendment, named after its sponsor, Rep. Tom
Feeney, markedly diminished judicial discretion in Guidelines sentencing and amended the
enabling legislation of the Sentencing Commission by striking the requirement that at least
three commissioners must be sitting federal judges and substituting a provision mandating
that no more than three judges may be commissioners. For discussion of the Feeney
Amendment from the perspective of the defense bar and some federal judges, see Mark H.
Allenbaugh, Fighting the Feeney Fear Factor: The Federal Courts Strike Back, CHAMPION,
Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 46. See also David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The
Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REv. 211 passim
[Vol. 58:235
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of congressional and judicial power in federal sentencing.
First, legislatures in modem American practice have virtually plenary
power to define crimes.10 The ancient common law power of judges to define
new crimes through adjudication survives, if it does at all, only as a vestigial
practice in a tiny number of states, and then only as to misdemeanors and petty
offenses.
1 1
Second, at present, legislatures also have virtually plenary power to set the
punishments attendant upon conviction of a crime. 12 The only constitutional
limitation on the type or severity of punishment a legislature may assign to
conviction of a crime is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 13 The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has produced a lush thicket of substantive and procedural constraints on the
imposition of the death penalty, 14 but its recent cases have imposed scarcely
any meaningful limitation on the imposition of incarcerative punishments. 15
(2004). For Congressman Feeney's view of his own amendment, see Tom Feeney, Letter to
the Editor, Justice Should Be the Same for All, NAT'L J., Feb. 14, 2003.
10. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 58 (1996) ("States enjoy wide latitude in
defining the elements of criminal offenses .... When a State's power to define criminal
conduct is challenged under the Due Process Clause, we inquire only whether the law
'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental."' (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977))
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). There is debate over whether legislatures can treat certain kinds
of facts, such as those affecting the existence or type of mens rea, as affirmative defenses or
withdraw them from the jury's consideration altogether. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58
(discussing whether the Montana legislature could bar the admission of evidence of
intoxication on the question of whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state for a
crime); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197 (discussing whether the Due Process Clause prohibits
"burdening the defendant in a New York State murder trial with proving the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law"). But these are
boundary issues that affect the core of legislative definitional power scarcely at all.
11. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 195 (1985) ("Judicial crime creation [in the United States] is a
thing of the past.").
12. At the federal level, the power of Congress to define and punish crime is subject to
some modest jurisdictional limitations. The Constitution provides direct textual authorization
to Congress to define and set punishments only for crimes involving the securities and
coinage of the United States, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, offenses
against the law of nations, and matters occurring in the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8. All other federal criminal legislation-which is to say virtually the entire federal
criminal code-is constitutionally justifiable largely as an exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the myriad cases it spawned
addressing the constitutional limitations on imposition of the death penalty.
15. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding two consecutive
sentences of twenty-five years to life for a repeat offender who stole $150 in videotapes);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (finding no constitutional error in a sentence of
twenty-five years to life for a repeat offender who stole three golf clubs valued at $1200).
For an analysis of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments
October 2005]
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Third, when we speak of the legislative power to define a crime, we mean
that the legislature's specification of a set of facts which must be proven for
criminal liability to attach and its specification of the punishment attendant
upon proof of that set of facts are inextricably linked components of the single
legislative act of crime definition. This is the central insight of the Supreme
Court's Sixth Amendment jury trial jurisprudence in Apprendi v. New Jersey,16
Blakely v. Washington,17 and United States v. Booker.18 These cases say, in
effect, that a "crime" consists of a designated list of facts that trigger eligibility
for a designated range or quantum of punishment. If proof of a fact affects the
range or quantum of punishment (at least in certain ways) then that fact
becomes part of the definition of a "crime," and thus subject to the full panoply
of procedural protections associated in the Bill of Rights with criminal trials. 19
Fourth, while Congress can neither adjudicate individual civil or criminal
cases (except those involving impeachment 2 ) nor impose criminal sentences
on individual defendants, 2 1 it can establish rules of evidence
22 and procedure2 3
governing the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of punishments by the
courts. In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress delegated the task of
drafting sentencing rules to the U.S Sentencing Commission, but lrovided that
the rules could not go into effect until Congress approved them. 25 Moreover,
Congress reserved to itself the power to disapprove of subsequent Guidelines
amendments promulgated by the Commission, 26 to recommend or direct that
jurisprudence, see generally Thomas G. Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=703103 (last
visited Sept. 16, 2005)).
16. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
17. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
18. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
19. At present, this holding is limited to facts that trigger increases in the maximum
sentence to which a defendant might be exposed upon conviction. As discussed in greater
detail below, infra notes 35 & 103 and accompanying text, the Court now permits judges to
determine facts that generate minimum sentences so long as such sentences are lower than
the legislatively designated maximum. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002);
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE, 5-6 (2d ed.
1999) (summarizing legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
23. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were first adopted by the Supreme Court
in response to congressional legislation. U.S. Supreme Court Order of Dec. 26, 1944
("prescribing" rules of criminal procedure).
24. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat.
1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
25. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2005) (providing that Guidelines amendments properly
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission and submitted to Congress will go into effect
180 days after submission unless "modified or disapproved by Act of Congress").
[Vol. 58:235
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the Commission enact amendments, 27 and to amend the Guidelines directly by
statute.
28
Fifth, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress can make
sentencing rules itself or delegate their making to a sentencing commission.
29
When the Court finally found the Guidelines unconstitutional in United States
v. Booker, it did so based not on their substance, but on a question of
procedure-the identity of the sentencing fact-finder. 30 Nothing in Booker
suggests any limitation on congressional power to legislate exactly the same
sentences called for by the Guidelines based on exactly the same facts. 3 1 The
only meaningful constitutional constraints on congressional sentencing
authority are procedural limits imposed by the Sixth Amendment jury trial
clause and the largely latent Due Process Clauses. At present, the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury decide any fact other than one relating to
criminal history32 which, if proven, would increase a defendant's maximum
sentencing exposure. 33 However, in Harris v. United States, the Court held that
judges could find facts generating mandatory minimum sentences. 34 And the
Booker remedial majority strongly suggests that facts which increase a
maximum presumptive sentence can be found by judges, so long as judges
retain some as-yet-undefined degree of discretion to impose sentences greater
27. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 805, 905, 1104,
116 Stat. 765 (2002) (containing general and specific directives to the Sentencing
Commission regarding amendments to guidelines relating to economic crimes).
28. Congress exercised the power to directly amend the Sentencing Guidelines for the
first time in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2G2.2(b) (2004) (Trafficking in Material Relating to Exploitation of a Minor), amended by
PROTECT Act § 401(i)(1)(C); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (Acceptance
of Responsibility), amended by PROTECT Act § 401(g); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 4B1.5 (Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors), amended by
PROTECT Act § 401(i)(1)(A); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, various
sections (relating to grounds for departure), amended by PROTECT Act § 401(b)(1)-(5).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 775 (2005); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-84, 387 (1989).
30. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J.).
31. Indeed, Justice Stevens in his Booker dissent was at pains to point out that
Congress could reenact the exact same guidelines system the Court was declaring
unconstitutional so long as the mechanism for finding sentencing facts complied with the
Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's
remedial majority opinion quibbles with Justice Stevens's phrasing, but does not deny the
essential point. Id. at 759 (Breyer, J.).
32. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998) (holding that
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor to be decided by a judge, rather than as an element
of a crime to be decided by a jury, does not violate the Constitution).
33. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759; Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004).
34. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
October 2005]
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than that presumptive maximum. 35 The Court could elect to impose more
significant due process constraints on sentencing proceedings before judges,
but it has so far been reluctant to do so.
36
Sixth, while a good many people intuitively feel that the determination of
individually tailored sentences for criminal defendants is an integral part of the
judicial function,37 that view has, at present, no constitutional foundation. After
all, the Constitution requires only one Supreme Court, leaving the creation of
lower federal courts to the discretion of Congress.38 The Judiciary Act of 1789,
which commentators often accord quasi-constitutional status, granted lower
federal courts jurisdiction over certain criminal matters, but that grant included
no reference to judicial sentencing authority.39 Over the years, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress can constitutionally create a sentencing scheme
that gives virtually unlimited sentencing discretion to judges40 or, as in the
cases of single-penalty sentencing schemes and mandatory minimum sentences,
virtually no discretion at all.41
The confluence of the foregoing points means that Congress can define
virtually any objectionable conduct as a crime and impose virtually any
punishment it chooses for that conduct and that the federal courts presently
possess virtually no direct constitutional control over Congress's power to do
so. The power courts possess is over sentencing procedure; yet in Apprendi,
Blakely, and Booker, the Court has taken only very modest steps toward
imposing meaningful procedural constraints on the imposition of noncapital
punishments. 42 Even if the Court were to impose further procedural
requirements-for example, by overturning Harris and requiring jury findings
of facts generating mandatory minimum sentences or by imposing greater due
35. For a more detailed analysis of this point, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond
BandAids, supra note 5, at 30-32 & nn.202-206.
36. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, Completing the Sentencing Revolution:
Reconsidering Sentencing Procedure in the Guidelines Era, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 187 (2000)
[hereinafter Bowman, Completing the Sentencing Revolution].
37. See, e.g., KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 6-7, 78-79 (1998). For a critique of this view, see Frank
0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 310-26 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, Fear
of Law].
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
39. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 29, 33, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
40. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (referring to "[t]oday's
philosophy of individualizing sentences"); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932)
("It is necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful, humane, and comprehensive
consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible only in the
exercise of a broad discretion.").
41. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991); supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
42. See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (2005).
[Vol. 58:235
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process protections on judicial sentencing proceedings-such requirements
would burden federal trial judges and complicate the lives of federal
prosecutors. However, these procedural constraints would limit congressional
sentencing authority only indirectly and only to the extent that Congress proved
unwilling to impose additional burdens on judges and prosecutors by enacting
sentencing rules that triggered additional procedural protections. As ineffectual
as such an exertion of judicial authority might seem, I will argue in the
following Parts that further action by the Court overturning Harris and also
"constitutionalizing" some degree of judicial sentencing discretion is an
essential component of any solution to the present federal sentencing problem.
B. The Justice Department and Its Prosecutors
First formed in 1870, the Justice Department is a relative historical
newcomer43 and has no constitutional authority over sentencing. For many
years in the pre-Guidelines era, a component of the Justice Department, the
United States Parole Commission, effectively shared sentencing power with the
judiciary by virtue of the Commission's parole release authority.4 4 However,
that authority disappeared in 1987 with the Sentencing Reform Act's abolition
of parole.4 5 Of course, the Justice Department and its prosecutors have always
played an important advocacy role in making and enforcing sentencing rules,
but the Department has no constitutional power (and, until recently, had no
statutory authority) to make rules directly governing the judicial imposition of
sentences. As we will see, perhaps the greatest change wrought by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the advent of the Guidelines era has been a
fundamental transformation of the role of federal prosecutors in sentencing.
II. THE STATE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
A. The Advent of the Guidelines
A focus on the power relationships between institutional sentencing actors
explains a great deal of federal sentencing policy over the last few decades. The
principal critique of the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system was that it
concentrated too much power in the hands of individual sentencing judges,
43. The office of Attorney General of the United States was created by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789), but the Justice Department was not
created until 1870, Act To Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (repealed 1984) (setting out powers of United States
Parole Commission). For a general study of federal parole decisionmaking, see DON M.
GOTTFREDSON, LESLIE T. WILKINS & PETER B. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND
SENTENCING (1978).
45. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, Competing Sentencing
Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 305, 306 (1993).
October 2005]
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power that was unconstrained either by a priori legislative rules or even by post
hoc appellate review. 46 This critique was somewhat overstated inasmuch as it
ignored the counter-balancing effect of back-end release authority of parole
boards.4 7 But it is nonetheless true that the old system did not give Congress,
prosecutors, appellate courts, or defendants any meaningful power either to set
or to dispute sentences.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198448 was designed to remedy the old
system's institutional imbalance. On paper, the Act distributed sentencing
authority in an extraordinarily sensible way. It created the Sentencing
Commission,4 9 which was to serve as an expert neutral rulemaker, reasonably
insulated from direct political pressure, and also to serve as a forum for policy
debate among the other institutional actors. Congress retained ultimate
authority over the Commission's rules50 but would in theory stay out of the
details of sentencing policy, or at least would give substantial deference to the
Commission's conclusions.
The Justice Department was granted a nonvoting ex officio seat on the
Sentencing Commission, but was intended to be only one among many voices
in sentencing rulemaking. 51 Nonetheless, the Guidelines promulgated by the
Commission granted prosecutors an unprecedented measure of authority over
particular sentences because the pre-Booker Guidelines were mandatory and
fact-driven, and prosecutors are largely in control of sentencing facts. 52 Even at
the individual case level, the relevant conduct rules were designed to ensure
that prosecutors did not manipulate their control of the facts into absolute
control over sentencing outcomes.
53
46. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973)
(observing that "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to
the rule of law"). For a summary of the critiques of federal sentencing prior to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning To Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 680-89 [hereinafter Bowman, Quality of Mercy].
47. Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 46, at 681-82.
48. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat.
1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2005).
50. See infra notes 73 and 91 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
authority over sentencing rules generally and over the Guidelines in particular).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (making the Attorney General or his designee an ex officio
member of the Sentencing Commission).
52. Prosecutors control sentencing facts in the sense that they customarily possess both
knowledge of the evidence available to prove facts relevant to sentencing and some degree
of discretion about whether to present such evidence to the court. See Bowman, Fear of Law,
supra note 37, at 341-47; Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 46, at 724-30; Frank 0.
Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining
Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 512-
25 (2002).
53. For discussion of the effect of the relevant conduct rules, see Bowman, Quality of
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Trial judges lost their former plenary authority over front-end sentencing,
but retained substantial theoretical sentencing discretion through the
unconstrained power to sentence within ranges, 54 through the departure power
to impose sentences outside of ranges, 55 and through the hidden but very real
de facto discretionary authority that they were given through the power to find
sentencing facts. 56 Appellate judges gained an unprecedented role in sentencing
through the review function. 57 The Sentencing Reform Act affected other
institutional players as well-changing the role of probation officers from quasi
social workers to special masters of Guidelines fact-finding 5 8 and abolishing
the parole board altogether.
59
Had this system worked as envisioned, it would have produced an
admirable distribution of sentencing authority. As envisioned, Congress would
set the upper and lower limits of punishment for general categories of crimes,
while continuing to act as a democratic check on the judgments of the specialist
Sentencing Commission about how to guide judicial discretion within the
legislatively created range. Judges would have the benefit of sentencing
guidance combined with ample, if not unlimited, power to fashion an
appropriate sentence within, or occasionally outside of, a range specified in the
Guidelines. For the first time, prosecutors would have a meaningful say in
sentencing through their mastery of the facts and would gain a useful
investigative tool in the substantial assistance motion.60 Nonetheless, the
absence of direct executive branch control over sentencing rules combined with
the Guidelines' relevant conduct provision that ostensibly limited prosecutorial
ability to manipulate individual sentences would prevent prosecutors from
Mercy, supra note 46, at 702-03; William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495
(1990).
54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Cl.1(a) (2004) ("A sentence conforms
with the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the
applicable guideline range.").
55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (2005) (detailing the approved
grounds for upward or downward departures).
56. See Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 37, at 338.
57. Compare Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines
system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not
reviewable on appeal."), with 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2005) (creating a right of appeal of a
Guidelines sentence in both the defendant and the government).
58. See Bowman, Completing the Sentencing Revolution, supra note 36, at 190-91
(discussing role of probation officers in Guidelines sentencing).
59. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 53, at 306.
60. A "substantial assistance motion" is a request by the government that the defendant
be given a sentence below the otherwise applicable Guidelines range, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2005), or mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(2005), based on the defendant's cooperation with the government in the investigation or
prosecution of others. For discussion of such motions, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing
Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures
Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7 (1999).
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dominating the system. Defendants would know the facts that mattered to their
sentences and would have an opportunity to litigate them. And the Sentencing
Commission would treat the sentencing behavior of judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel as a critical form of feedback upon which sensible
amendments to the system could be based.
B. The Failure of the Guidelines
Despite its hopeful beginnings, the federal sentencing system as constituted
before Booker failed. The system has suffered two principal substantive
failures. First, the federal sentencing rulemaking power has become a one-way
upward ratchet in which the sentences nominally required by the Guidelines are
raised easily and often and lowered only rarely and with the greatest difficulty.
Second, both judges and prosecutors have increasingly treated structured-
sentencing rules primarily as tools for inducing guilty pleas and cooperation
with the government. The consequence of these two failures operating in
tandem has been unjustifiably long sentences imposed in some significant if
unquantifiable fraction of federal cases, together with a steadily decreasing
connection between the sentences the Guidelines ostensibly require and those
actually imposed, as front-line sentencing actors evade the rules either to
achieve what they perceive to be justice in individual cases or simply to further
investigations or manage caseloads.
The substantive failures of the guidelines system occurred because the
institutional balance that the Sentencing Reform Act was supposed to create
broke down. The power that was concentrated unduly in the hands of trial
judges and parole boards before the introduction of the Guidelines has migrated
to an equally unbalanced concentration of power in the hands of prosecutors at
the case level and an alliance between the Justice Department and Congress at
the policy level. Three factors have been crucial in producing this state of
affairs: the complexity of the federal sentencing system centered on the
Guidelines, the rigidity of that system, and money.
The federal sentencing system is the most complex ever devised. To some
extent, the system's complexity is unsurprising. The federal criminal code is a
vast, undisciplined sprawl which features hundreds of substantive offenses
carrying a patchwork array of penalties ranging from fines and probation to
steeply punitive mandatory minimum sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act
did nothing to simplify the code and instead commanded the first Sentencing
Commission to create a guidelines system that would be overlaid on the code as
it stood. The Commission's task was rather like that of an architect hired to
design a mansion on a wildly irregular plot of land with the proviso that the
building must be erected with no grading of the lot or preparation of the
foundation. The Commission's task was further complicated by the Act's so-
called "twenty-five-percent rule," a provision designed to tightly cabin judicial
discretion by requiring that the Guidelines ranges created by the Commission
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be fairly narrow.6 1 The product of the Commission's work was a system
consisting of a 258-box sentencing grid6 2 with accompanying instructions
sitting on top of a statutory structure that in some cases, such as those involving
mandatory minimum sentences, trumped the Commission's Guidelines. The
complexity of this system, in combination with its mandatory nature, has
proved to be its undoing.
C. Prosecutorial Power Under the Guidelines
Before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the role of the federal
prosecutor in both sentencing rulemaking and the imposition of sentences was
almost exclusively that of an advocate, rather than a primary decisionmaker.
The Guidelines fundamentally altered the prosecutorial role both in court and in
rulemaking. The change is most obvious in court. Before the Guidelines,
prosecutors could exercise some direct control over a defendant's sentence
through their charging and plea bargaining functions. Nonetheless, the result of
a conviction by either trial or plea was a broad statutory sentencing range
within which the judge had virtually unlimited sentencing authority. At the
sentencing hearing, a prosecutor could advocate a particular sentence, but had
no effective means of imposing his or her preferences on the court. At
sentencing hearings under the Guidelines, prosecutors are still advocates who
address arguments to a judge. But the nature of the advocacy has changed from
the pre-Guidelines role largely limited to allocution to one focused first on
proving facts that trigger rules which limit the judge's discretion and only
secondarily on allocution regarding the preferred sentence within the range
dictated by the fact-based Guidelines.
Equally importantly, the Guidelines system has markedly enhanced the
power of prosecutors to influence the range of available sentencing options
before the sentencing hearing ever begins. Under the system that has evolved
since the Guidelines became effective in 1987, prosecutors have the option to
charge multiple offenses involving the same conduct but carrying different
penalties;6 3 to charge or not to charge a variety of mandatory sentencing
provisions based on factors such as drug quantity, weapon possession,64 or
61. The "twenty-five-percent rule" effectively imposed a mathematical requirement
that a sentencing grid contain at least eighteen vertical offense levels. See Bowman, Failure
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1334. The creation of a horizontal
criminal history axis of the sentencing table containing six boxes necessitated a table with no
fewer than 108 boxes. A series of decisions by the original Commission produced a
sentencing table even more complex than required. Id. at 1324-34.
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2004).
63. For example, a defendant in a fraud case involving more than one defendant can be
charged based on the same conduct with either wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005), which
now carries a maximum penalty of thirty years, or conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2005), the maximum penalty for which is only five years.
64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2005) (imposing minimum mandatory penalties for
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second-offender status; 65 and (despite the nominal constraint imposed by the
relevant conduct rules) to prove or abstain from proving an ever-growing list of
aggravating or mitigating factors specified in the Guidelines themselves. 66 The
more fact-based decision points that exist between case intake and sentence
imposition, the greater direct control prosecutors will exercise over sentencing
outcomes. The fewer such decision points, the less direct control prosecutors
exercise. The combination of complex Guidelines overlaid on a system of
statutory minimum mandatories and fact-based enhancements has turned
prosecutors into primary decisionmakers whose choices can, to a far greater
extent than was ever before possible, unilaterally constrain the judge's
discretion.
At the rulemaking level, the pre-Guidelines Justice Department had no
direct control over rules governing front-end judicial sentencing. Sentencing
rules were made by Congress. The Justice Department was a respected voice in
congressional deliberations, but it had no institutional presence in Congress and
could neither make nor change sentencing rules itself. The Guidelines and
associated legislation changed that situation.
First, by giving the Justice Department a seat on the Sentencing
Commission, even a nonvoting ex officio seat, the Sentencing Reform Act gave
the Department an institutional presence in all public and private Commission
meetings and deliberations, something that was not and could not be true of the
relation of any executive branch agency to Congress.
67
Second, application of the complex Sentencing Guidelines and associated
statutes necessarily depends on a multitude of discretionary choices by
individual federal prosecutors and their offices. The multiplication of such
choices invites the inevitable bureaucratic response of departmental policies
and regulations governing the behavior of individual prosecutors in the field. In
order to preserve prosecutorial discretion, the Justice Department has avoided
promulgating detailed national regulations governing prosecutorial charging
and bargaining decisions. However, Attorneys General have issued orders both
expanding and contracting the degree of autonomy enjoyed by United States
possession of firearms in connection with designated criminal offenses).
65. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) (2005) (granting United States Attorneys authority to
file an information triggering the applicability of enhanced penalties for drug defendants
with prior convictions).
66. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387-89, 402-
11, 415-19, 426-35 (2004).
67. While the Act guaranteed the Justice Department access to and a voice in both the
public and private (essentially legislative) deliberations of the Sentencing Commission,
Congress would never guarantee representatives of the executive branch similar entrde into
its own legislative deliberations. Indeed, any such guarantee might violate the constitutional
separation of powers.
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Attorneys and their assistants. 68 More importantly, at the district level, United
States Attorney's Offices adopt local declination and plea bargaining policies
that act as binding sentencing rules within that jurisdiction.
Finally, the trend of recent sentencing legislation has been toward granting
the Justice Department direct authority over sentencing outcomes. Until very
recently, this authority took the form of statutes or guidelines requiring a
government motion before a judge could grant certain downward sentencing
adjustments. 69 But in the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress took the
remarkable step of giving the Attorney General direct regulatory authority to
create "early disposition programs" in selected districts with high caseloads.
70
Such programs permit extraordinary sentence discounts for early pleas.
Districts to which the Attorney General grants authority may have early
disposition programs; districts to which the authorization is refused may not.
The effect of the PROTECT Act is to grant the Attorney General the power to
change federal sentencing law on a regional basis by regulation.
Thus, the Justice Department is a mere advocate no longer. It is instead an
important, and perhaps preeminent, primary sentencing decisionmaker in
individual cases and has been accruing an increasing degree of both direct
authority and indirect influence over sentencing rules.
7 1
68. The ebb and flow of central control over federal prosecutors' charging and plea
bargaining authority can be seen by comparing a succession of memoranda and policy
statements issued by Attorneys General Richard Thornburgh, Janet Reno, and John Ashcroft.
See Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to Federal Prosecutors
(Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 1 FED. SENT'G REP. 421 (1989) ("The basic policy is that
charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith
doubt as to the government's ability readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary
reasons.... The Department's policy is only to stipulate to facts that accurately represent the
defendant's conduct."); Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Holders of
U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 352, 352
(1994) (arguably relaxing the standards of the Thornburgh memo by allowing prosecutors to
consider "such factors as [whether] the sentencing guideline range ... is proportional to the
seriousness of the defendant's conduct .... ); Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney
General, to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) (regarding the PROTECT Act and
reaffirming "Congress' intention that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing
Guidelines be faithfully and consistently enforced"), http://www.crimelynx.com/ashcharge
memo.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-2.170(B) (2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-roomusam/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
69. That is, the prosecutorial motion requirement for a substantial assistance departure
under both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2005) and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5K].1
(2004). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650.
71. In the interest of fair disclosure, when I first began writing about the Guidelines ten
years ago, I disparaged the notion that the Guidelines system had granted prosecutors undue
sentencing authority. Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 46, at 732 (discussing the
"bogeyman of rampant prosecutorial discretion"). Whether I have been wrong all along or
whether, as I think, the last decade has seen a steady and accelerating accretion of
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D. The Alliance of Congress and the Department of Justice
At the policy and rulemaking level, the complexity of the Guidelines
system provides an incentive and a mechanism for both the Justice Department
and Congress to intervene in the details of the sentencing rulemaking process.
72
In a very simple sentencing system, even one with guidelines, there are very
few ways for Congress to affect sentences directly. In such a system, Congress
can respond to political stimuli by increasing statutory maximum penalties.
Because few defendants ever receive the maximum possible sentence, however,
such increases are primarily symbolic. Congress can pass minimum mandatory
sentences, but mandatory sentences are clumsy instruments that Congress has,
at least until recently, employed only sparingly and, in any case, are likely to be
employed only once or twice for any given category of crime.73 Similarly, if
the Guidelines offense table contained only six or ten levels of offense severity
rather than forty-three, Congress could only increase sentences for any category
of crime so far and so often before exceeding the balance of the plainly
ridiculous. But by designing a system in which offense severity can be
subdivided 258 ways, the Sentencing Commission created a mechanism that
permits endless legislative tinkering in response to the crime du jour.
The usual, if not invariable, political instinct of Congress is to favor ever-
increasing criminal punishments. Thus, it may come as no surprise that the
advent of a complex sentencing mechanism permitting repeated, targeted
sentencing increases would produce a rising incidence of legislation calling for
such increases. However, the behavior of Congress would not have occurred, at
prosecutorial sentencing authority is a judgment best made by others.
72. The fact that legislatures, federal and state, have sometimes seemed to be allied
with prosecutors in pursuit of ever-higher sentences is not a new observation. See, e.g.,
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 537-
39 (2001) (asserting that overcriminalization expands prosecutorial power and noting an
alliance between legislators and prosecutors in the late twentieth century); Ian Weinstein,
Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have
Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 108-12
(2003) (arguing that the addition of new, more specific federal narcotics crimes and changes
in sentencing law shifted power to prosecutors from 1985 to 2000). However, the effect of
the particular architecture of the Guidelines-centered federal sentencing system on the
relation between Congress and federal prosecutors has not been fully appreciated.
73. When Congress imposes a mandatory minimum sentence the first time, that
sentence is likely to be stiff, indeed so stiff that it overpunishes at least some appreciable
fraction of the offenders to which it applies. See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56
STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1044-48 (2004) (discussing defects in mandatory minimum sentences);
Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) ("By contrast to the guidelines, I can accept
neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too many
cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust."), at http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-09-03.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). Where that is the
case, subsequent increases in the minimum sentence become less likely.
[Vol. 58:235
HeinOnline  -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 250 2005-2006
MADISON MEETS A TIME MACHINE
least to the same degree, without at least the acquiescence of the Justice
Department. The Justice Department has neither a vote nor a veto on
congressional sentencing legislation, but Congress listens more respectfully to
the Department than to any other outside voice on such matters. Therefore, the
behavior and motivations of the Justice Department under the complex
Guidelines system require careful analysis.
Institutionally, the Justice Department liked the pre-Booker Guidelines
system for many reasons, most unrelated to whether longer sentences are
objectively better than somewhat shorter ones in controlling crime. The
combination of complexity, rigidity, and severity conferred tremendous power
on prosecutors at the district level. The ability to threaten defendants with very
long sentences if they do not plead guilty or, where desired, cooperate against
others is a hugely powerful tool in inducing pleas and securing cooperation.
Early skeptics of the Guidelines predicted that the severity and rigidity of the
system would dramatically reduce the willingness of defendants to plead guilty,
thus causing the number of trials to skyrocket and the system to move toward
gridlock. The opposite has occurred. As the Guidelines and associated statutes
have grown ever more complex, giving prosecutors ever more bargaining chips,
the rate of guilty pleas has steadily increased.7 4 Intertwined with the overall
increase in plea rates has been the rise and increasing sophistication of the
government's use of sentencing levers to induce cooperation. 75 The Guidelines
have thus given the government a powerful toolbox it uses to manage an ever-
rising caseload 76 and to secure cooperation in multi-defendant cases.
Despite the usefulness to prosecutors of a complex, mandatory, fact-
dependent sentencing system, it is not immediately obvious why the Justice
Department has continued to push for or at least acquiesce in legislation calling
for higher sentences, given that federal sentences are already very stringent
indeed. The best explanation probably combines three considerations. First, the
Department has sometimes quite genuinely felt that certain classes of offenders
74. For example, between 1992 and 2002, the guilty-plea rate for drug-trafficking
offenders jumped from 82% to 97.2%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT
112-13; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
73 tbl.38 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK]. Interestingly,
the guilty-plea rate for drug-trafficking offenses dropped in 2003 to 95.6%. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 73 tbl.38. Whether this represents a one-time
statistical hiccup or a more sustained trend remains to be seen.
75. Between 1989 and 1994, the percentage of federal defendants who were granted
substantial assistance departures at the government's request increased from 3.5% to 19.5%.
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE WORKING GROUP, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL COURT
PRACTICES: SENTENCE REDUCTIONS BASED ON DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO
THE GOVERNMENT (1997). This trend moved downward slightly in 2002 to 17.4%. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74, at 51 fig.G.
76. The number of defendants sentenced in federal court increased from approximately
36,000 in 1988 (the first full year of Guidelines operation), U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1990
ANNUAL REPORT 39 fig.2 (1991), to 70,258 in 2003, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.A.
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were underpunished under existing rules. 77 Second, the Department has
developed a liking for the leverage brought by being able to threaten very long
sentences. To an increasing degree, the Department has come to justify its
requests for tougher sentencing rules, not on the ground that offenders actually
deserve the higher sentences, but simply because the threat of the higher
sentence provides a greater inducement for defendant cooperation.78 Third, in
those cases where the impetus for raising sentences comes from Congress, the
Department accepts the increases both in order to increase governmental
leverage and because the Justice Department knows that it retains effectively
unfettered discretion not to invoke the higher penalty in cases where
prosecutors deem it unjust or inappropriate to do so.
E. The Federal Budget and Federal Sentencing
Even if one views more stringent sentencing rules and rising federal prison
populations as an unalloyed social good, it is a good with a price tag like any
other social program. Consequently, one might expect that competition within
executive branch agencies for budgetary resources and the need for Congress to
choose among competing social priorities would impose a limit on the upward
movement of federal criminal sentences. Yet neither the Justice Department
77. See, e.g., Testimony of Mark E. Matthews, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Before U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, (March 5, 1998) (advocating increases in sentences for tax
offenders), at http://www.ussc.gov/agendas/3-5-98/matthews.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2005); Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Before U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (March 19, 2001) ("Simply stated, the Department believes that
sentences in white collar crime cases are often far too lenient, and need to be increased, not
decreased. Accordingly, the Department strongly supports the Commission's efforts to
change the law's tables to increase sentences for mid- and high-level white collar crimes."),
at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/Pubhmg200l.htm (last visited Sept. 19. 2005); Written
Statement of James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Before
U.S. Sentencing Commission 4 (March 23, 2000) (urging sentence increases for economic
crime offenses involving "high dollar losses"), at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/3_23_00/
RobinsonDOJ.PDF (last visited Sept. 19. 2005).
78. See Sue Reisinger, Government Seeks Tougher Sentences, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10,
2003, at A20 (providing statement of Drew Hruska, senior counsel to deputy attorney
general, arguing for across-the-board economic crime sentence increases to provide leverage
to secure cooperation). Associate Attorney General Catherine O'Neil testified:
Equally importantly, mandatory minimum sentences provide an indispensable tool for
prosecutors, because they provide the strongest incentive to defendants to cooperate against
the others who were involved in their criminal activity. In drug cases, where the ultimate goal
is to rid society of the entire trafficking enterprise, mandatory minimum statutes are
especially significant. . . The offer of relief from a mandatory minimum sentence in
exchange for truthful testimony allows the Government to move steadily and effectively up
the chain of supply, using the lesser distributors to prosecute the more serious dealers and
their leaders and suppliers.
Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection
Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Catherine
M. O'Neil, Associate Deputy Attorney General).
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(home of the Bureau of Prisons) nor Congress ever seems to count the cost of
the higher sentences. This budgetary heedlessness stands in marked contrast to
the behavior of the states, in which many legislatures have responded to the
rising costs of mass incarceration by moderating their sentencing policies.
79
The difference between state and federal approaches can be explained by
noting that state legislatures operate under two constraints Congress lacks.
First, states are customarily obligated by law to balance their budgets.
80
Second, the proportion of state budgets devoted to law enforcement and
corrections expenditures is far higher than the relatively insignificant
proportion of the federal budget devoted to these functions. 8 1 Accordingly,
Congress can keep raising sentences almost indefinitely without ever
confronting either the legal obstacles or the painful budgetary trade-offs that
their state counterparts must resolve. The lack of perceived economic constraint
on federal sentencing policy has led to a failure by Congress to perform, in this
field at least, its constitutional role of balancing national priorities.
F. The Sentencing Commission
The Commission is the product of an identifiable view of both government
generally and criminal sentencing more particularly. Speaking broadly, the
United States Sentencing Commission is an expression of confidence in the
administrative state: the idea that "experts" insulated from politics are well
suited (and sometimes best suited) to make important public choices. More
particularly, the Commission exists because a prominent strain of thinking in
the sentencing reform movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s held that
criminal sentencing was both too complex and too politically charged to be left
79. See DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Is THE
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 4
(2002) (discussing how state budget shortfalls have translated into reduction of criminal
penalties); JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR
CHANGING ATrITUDES? SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003 1-2 (2004) (same).
80. See RONALD K. SNELL, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENT: PROVISIONS AND PRACTICE (2004), at http://www.ncsl.
org/programs/fiscal/balbuda.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
81. From 2002 to 2004, corrections expenditures alone, not counting the costs of the
police and courts, averaged roughly seven percent of the general fund expenditures of the
states. NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 60
tbl.34 (2004), http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/2003ExpendReport.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2005). By contrast, in 2001, the federal government spent approximately $25
billion on direct expenditures for criminal and civil justice, including corrections, courts, law
enforcement, and civil justice costs. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, EXPENDITURE AND
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/eande.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2005). In 2001, the federal budget was $1.8 trillion, meaning that the federal
expenditures for all criminal and civil justice constituted approximately 1.4% of the federal
budget in that year. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL
BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2001, at iii (2001),
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy0l/pdf/guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
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entirely to the judgment of politicians.82
The drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act intended that the United States
Sentencing Commission be an expert body insulated from politics. 83 To insure
the Commission's political and institutional neutrality, the Sentencing Reform
Act situated the Commission outside both of the political branches of
government and made it independent even of the normal chain of command in
the judicial branch in which it formally resides. 84
Even if one believes in the administrative state and agrees that politically
neutral experts are the best sentencing rulemakers, in domestic public life, as in
international relations, neutrality can be a very difficult posture to maintain. As
the history of twentieth-century Europe demonstrated repeatedly, an entity can
only remain neutral if it is strong enough to repel aggression alone or has
powerful neighbors who see maintenance of that neutrality as consistent with
their own interests. 85 The problem for the Sentencing Commission has been
that it lacks both power of its own and powerful institutional allies with an
enduring commitment to the Commission's independence.
The Commission is not a part of the executive branch, which is good
insofar as it ensures that sentencing rulemaking is not under the direct control
of the administration of the day, but bad inasmuch as the Commission lacks the
legitimacy and political clout of executive branch agencies whose rules carry
the imprimatur of the president. The Sentencing Commission is distinct even
from other "independent" agencies of the federal government. Almost unique
among agencies of analogous design and function, the Sentencing Commission
lacks powerful competing interest groups on both sides of the issues it is
charged with deciding. For example, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, while independent, 86 have powerful
constituencies on both sides of most issues they must resolve. By contrast, there
are powerful voices perennially seeking tougher criminal sentences, but no
82. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976).
83. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) ("Developing
proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of
offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an
expert body is especially appropriate.").
84. See id. at 393 (noting that the Sentencing Commission "is not a court, does not
exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial
Branch").
85. See, e.g., GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS 73-89, 107-21, 173-74, 397-
98 (1994) (describing the posture of neutral countries at the outset of World War II, the
German violation of the neutrality of Belgium, Norway, and Denmark, and the position of
Switzerland and Turkey throughout the war).
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2005) (creating the Securities
and Exchange Commission as an independent agency); Marc Winerman, The Origins of the
FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 59-60
(2003) (describing the creation of the Federal Trade Commission as an independent agency).
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constellation of politically influential voices on the other side of the issue. 87
Nor is the Sentencing Commission in the legislative branch, a fact that was
at the root of the constitutional challenge to the Commission on the grounds of
impermissible delegation of legislative authority. 88 Implicit in Justice Scalia's
famous crack about the Commission being a "junior-varsity Congress" 89 is the
reality that it lacks important attributes of the real Congress. The Commission
has been asked to perform an essentially legislative task with high political
visibility, but it has neither the democratic legitimacy conferred by elections
nor the power conferred by the Constitution on Congress itself vis-A-vis other
institutions of the federal government. Scalia was making a constitutional
argument about excessive delegation of congressional authority, but the
practical problem with the Commission has proven to be not that it has too
much legislative authority, but that it has too little-that the Commission is too
much a creature of Congress, unable to exercise independent judgment, or at
least to make such judgments stick.
Finally, though the Commission is formally within the judicial branch and
has judges among its members, it lacks the signature power of the judiciary in
interbranch competition: the power to rule an executive act unlawful or a
congressional enactment unconstitutional. In the Commission setting, the
judge-commissioners have the personal independence that comes with a
lifetime appointment to the bench, but in all other respects they are
indistinguishable from any other political appointee. The nonjudge sentencing
commissioners lack even the protection of life tenure. Thus, the peculiar
position of the Sentencing Commission in the federal government makes it an
orphan, an oddity even in the judicial branch of which it is nominally a part,
powerless to resist a combination of the legislative and executive branches.
In the first years after the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, the
Commission was essential to both the creation and development of the
Guidelines system. But the Commission's power has waned for at least two
reasons. First, and most fundamentally, although a body of experts was
necessary to design a sentencing system, once the system was in place, no
particular expertise was required to fiddle with it. Indeed, as noted above, the
complexity of the system positively invites nonspecialist tinkering, and the
Congress-Justice Department alliance has tinkered ever more avidly with each
87. In saying this, I do not denigrate the persistent toil of representatives of the
criminal defense bar such as the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the
American Bar Association, the National Association of Federal Defenders, and the
Commission's own Practitioners' Advisory Group, or the work of advocacy groups such as
Families Against Mandatory Minimums. I merely state a political reality, namely that
criminal defense lawyers and other advocates for criminal defendants have relatively little
political clout in comparison to the sorts of interest groups that customarily become involved
in policy disputes before most other federal agencies.
88. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370.
89. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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passing year.
Second, for all the structural reasons just noted, the Commission lacks any
effective means of counteracting a determined combination of Congress and the
executive branch. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the
Commission became estranged from the judiciary, its institutional home and
natural ally in interbranch competition, early in its history and has never
entirely healed the breach. The estrangement began with the judiciary's initial
negative reaction to the Guidelines. Many judges found the Commission and its
Guidelines to be unconstitutional. And even after the Guidelines were deemed
constitutional by the Supreme Court, many trial judges were initially disposed
to treat them as suggestions rather than rules. The Commission found itself at
odds with a judiciary hostile to its product and its mission and, as a result, for a
long time saw a big part of its job as reining in judicial resistance to the
Guidelines. In consequence, the Commission was for years almost an alien
body within the judiciary branch. Even though the relationship has warmed as
the two sides have realized their common interests in the face of the Congress-
Justice Department combination, the Commission's dealings with the judiciary
remain very much at arm's length.
In sum, the combination of the natural legislative disposition to increase
sentences for political gain, the absence of any fiscal governor on that
disposition, the Justice Department's institutional interest in the power
conferred by a complex federal sentencing guidelines system, and the weakness
and isolation of the Sentencing Commission has caused the system to evolve
into an increasingly complicated and powerful piece of machinery whose many
gears move only one way: slowly, steadily, pawl by pawl, upward.
Ill. SOME PRESCRIPTIONS
The situation described so far presents two interlocking problems for the
would-be reformer. The first is how to design a federal sentencing system that
addresses the principal defects in the system created by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, most particularly the institutional imbalances that have made the
rulemaking process a one-way, upward ratchet. The second and far more
difficult problem is figuring out how a new and substantially improved system
could ever be enacted when the primary defect of the existing system is that it
confers too much power on the political branches of government whose support
would be necessary to enact a replacement regime.
A. What To Do
1. Booker is not the answer
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker has not provided
a solution to the systemic defects recounted above. The problem is that the
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system of advisory guidelines created by the Booker remedial opinion leaves
virtually all of the undesirable features of the old system intact. The Guidelines
and associated sentencing statutes are still too complex, still provide multiple
levers for prosecutorial control of sentencing outcomes, and still provide the
same incentives and mechanisms for congressional micromanagement. The
only difference between pre- and post-Booker Guidelines is that judges now
have some as-yet-undefined amount of additional discretion to vary from the
Guidelines, and the govemment has experienced a very modest (and probably
short-lived) reduction in control over sentencing outcomes. 90 Should the
Booker system survive, the exercise of the added judicial discretion might
secure better outcomes for some defendants, but it would also inevitably create
more interjudge and interdistrict disparity. 9 1
Judges, the defense bar, and some academic observers seem to be
mesmerized by Booker, perhaps because they view the system it imposed as
both incrementally better than the system it overthrew and markedly better than
any system the current Congress would be likely to invent. While I am
sympathetic to these sentiments, I think the Booker system is politically
unsustainable over the long term. Indeed, the long term may prove quite short
now that the Attorney General has expressed his dissatisfaction with post-
Booker advisory Guidelines and provisionally endorsed a proposal to inoculate
the Guidelines against Sixth Amendment defects by making the minimum of
Guidelines ranges enforceable as they were before Blakely and Booker while
removing or rendering advisory the maximums of the Guidelines ranges.92 This
90. One point about the post-Booker regime that has caused the Justice Department
particular concern is the de facto repeal of the government's monopoly on substantial
assistance motions. See Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Sentencing Guidelines
Speech (June 21, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales Speech], at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005); Statement of Christopher
Wray, Assistant Attorney General, The Future of Sentencing, Testimony Before the U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (Nov. 17, 1004), at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11-16 04/Wray-
testimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). However, it is quite clear that, even if the
Department were to refrain from seeking legislation aimed at a thoroughgoing "Booker fix,"
it will surely seek and obtain legislation reinstating the substantial assistance motion
monopoly. See, e.g., Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005, H.R.
1528, 109th Cong. (2005).
91. Over time, as Congress and the Justice Department continued to nudge up the
Guidelines sentences for crimes and judges grew increasingly confident in their power to
adjust sentences in individual cases, the gap between the sentences the law declared to be
presumptively correct and the sentences actually imposed would widen, at least for
defendants sentenced by assertive judges or in circuits hospitable to a robust exercise of
judicial discretion.
92. See Gonzales Speech, supra note 90. The approach discussed by Attorney General
Gonzales was first publicly advanced in a memorandum I wrote to the United States
Sentencing Commission in June 2004 as an interim solution to the crisis created by Blakely.
Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong (July 13, 2004) (testimony of Frank 0.
Bowman, III); see also Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug
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approach would restore the pre-Booker Guidelines system almost exactly as it
was before. Thus, the two questions posed at the beginning of this Part-what
should a new system look like and how can a desirable system be enacted when
the current Guidelines system is so favorable to Congress and the Justice
Department-remain to be answered.
2. The virtues of simplicity
A detailed description of a new and improved federal sentencing system is
beyond the scope of this Article, but the outlines can be sketched succinctly.
First, sentencing guidelines are, in principle, still a good idea. As the
Sentencing Initiative of the bipartisan Constitution Project recently concluded,
"Sentencing guidelines are best capable of controlling unwarranted disparities
while retaining appropriate flexibility [and they] enhance public confidence in
the sentencing system by being open about the factors upon which sentences
are being based. ' 93 Second, federal sentences should be somewhat less
stringent than they now are, at least for some crimes and classes of offenders.
At an absolute minimum, the rulemaking system must be made hospitable to
downward as well as upward adjustments of sentencing levels. Third, a revised
federal sentencing system must be compliant with the letter of the Supreme
Court's developing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and should be consistent
with the spirit of that jurisprudence by providing an appropriate role for juries
in finding facts important to sentencing. Fourth, a revised federal sentencing
system should distribute the power to make and apply sentencing rules among
institutional sentencing actors more sensibly than the current system does.
Finally, the combination of excessive complexity and rigidity is the besetting
sin of the current system; therefore, proper institutional balance cannot be
achieved without a marked simplification of federal sentencing rules and
Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (July 6,
2004) (testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, III, suggesting "topless" guidelines as an interim
measure); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT'G
REP. 364 (2004). I do not, however, support it as a long-term alternative. See Implications of
the Booker/Fanfan Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, III) (emphasizing that "topless"
guidelines are not an appropriate long-term response to Booker).
93. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN AND REFORM OF SENTENCING
SYSTEMS (2005), http://www.constitutionproject.org/si/Principles.doc (last visited Aug. 28,
2005). In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004), the Constitution Project launched a Sentencing Initiative, which brought
together a committee of sentencing experts to study federal sentencing and propose
improvements to the system co-chaired by former Attorney General Edwin Meese and
former Deputy Attorney General Phillip Heymann. I serve as co-reporter to the Sentencing
Initiative.
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structures.
To accomplish the foregoing ends, I have elsewhere proposed a simplified
guidelines system.94 This system would center on a simplified sentencing table
consisting of nine base sentencing levels, eight of which would be subdivided
into three sub-ranges. Placement in the base sentencing range would result from
a combination of offense facts (either found by a jury or admitted in a plea)
with the defendant's criminal history. Placement in the sub-ranges would result
from post-conviction judicial findings of sentencing factors. No upward
departures from the base sentencing range would be permissible, but
defendants might be sentenced below the low end of the base sentencing range
as a result of an acceptance of responsibility credit or a downward departure
motion. Both the government and the defendant would retain rights of appeal of
post-conviction judicial findings of fact and of misapplications of the law.
The merits or demerits of this particular plan are unimportant to the present
discussion. The key for present purposes is that any successful reform must
markedly simplify the federal sentencing process and restore institutional
balance among the principal sentencing actors.
B. The Conditions Necessary for Success
In a nutshell, the political problem for serious federal sentencing reform is
this: the federal sentencing regime built around the Sentencing Guidelines in
both its pre- and post-Booker forms is substantively undesirable, but immensely
attractive to both Congress and the Justice Department. Under current Supreme
Court precedent, both the post-Booker system of presumptive/advisory
Guidelines and the Justice Department's preferred modification of making the
minimum Guidelines ranges mandatory are constitutionally acceptable.
Therefore, so long as Congress and the Justice Department remain allied in
support of some variant of the existing complex system, nothing important will
change. Consequently, a necessary precondition of meaningful reform is to
convince at least one (and preferably both) of these institutions that a
substantively better system would serve not only the public good, but also its
institutional interests.
No one should pretend that this political problem can be easily solved. The
solution requires the confluence of a number of nascent trends and perhaps
improbable events, as described in the following Parts.
1. Contributions from the Supreme Court
Beneficial change will require further developments in the Supreme
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. I think it exceedingly unlikely that
94. See Bowman, Beyond BandAids, supra note 5.
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the Justice Department will ever abandon its support of the Guidelines system
so long as the advantages this system confers on prosecutors continue to
outweigh the burdens. From the government's point of view, a signal advantage
of the original Guidelines system was that it cabined judicial discretion at a
very low procedural cost-the facts generating Guidelines ranges were either
stipulated to or adjudicated by judges in hearings characterized by a
preponderance of the evidence standard, little or no formal discovery, and
relaxed evidentiary rules. In the period between Blakely and Booker, the Justice
Department confronted the possibility that all Guidelines-related facts would
have to be pled in indictments and, if contested, proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to juries.95 Although opinion was not uniform throughout the
Department, the majority view (which was reflected in the government's
arguments before the Court in Booker96 ) was that trying to administer the
Guidelines as they existed through a regime of jury trials would be, if not
impossible, then at the least extraordinarily burdensome.
In her dissent in Blakely v. Washington, Justice O'Connor astutely
characterized the requirement of a jury trial for facts increasing maximum
sentencing exposure as a "constitutional tax" on the development of structured-
sentencing systems. 97 In other words, the Blakely decision allowed states and
the federal government to continue to utilize complex, fact-based sentencing
rules to cabin judicial sentencing discretion, but required the government to
bear the procedural burden of a full-blown jury trial on facts legally necessary
to increase maximum sentences. Booker's reconfiguration of the Sentencing
Guidelines into an "essentially advisory" system has allowed the government to
evade Blakely's constitutional tax, at least for the moment, because judges can
constitutionally find facts to trigger specified Guidelines ranges so long as the
maximums are advisory rather than mandatory.
So long as Booker itself remains good law and so long as the Justice
Department and Congress are content with advisory Guidelines, the idea of a
constitutional tax will remain unimportant. However, both Congress and the
Justice Department have expressed growing discomfort with treating the
95. Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal
Prosecutors, Regarding "Departmental Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v.
Washington 3-4 (July 2, 2004), http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencing-law-and-policy/
files/dag.blakely-memo_7204.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005); Memorandum from
Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors (2004)
(offering guidance for pending cases in applying the holding of Blakely v. Washington),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/chris-wray-doj-memo.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
96. Brief for the United States at 43-59, Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)
(Nos. 04-104 & 04-105) (arguing that the process of judicial finding of sentencing facts is
not severable from the Guidelines rules, in part on the ground that jury fact-finding would be
both cumbersome and inconsistent with the evident intention of Congress and the Sentencing
Commission).
97. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Guidelines as advisory, and both have expressed enthusiasm for proposals that
would make the minimums legally enforceable while leaving the maximums
advisory.98 These proposals take advantage of the Supreme Court's decision in
Harris v. United States99 that judges may constitutionally find facts that result
in minimum sentences.
As more than one observer has remarked, Harris is logically inconsistent
with Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.100 Why, after all, should the Sixth
Amendment require a jury trial on facts that increase a defendant's theoretical
maximum sentencing exposure but not on facts that increase the minimum
sentence he must receive by law? If the Supreme Court were to overturn Harris
and require jury trials for facts generating hard, enforceable minimum
sentences, such a decision would have important effects beyond the
rationalization of a comer of Sixth Amendment doctrine. Most immediately,
such a decision would foreclose the Justice Department's preferred legislative
option of reenacting the Guidelines in a form that would allow judicial findings
of fact to generate sentencing ranges with enforceable minimums and advisory
maximums.
With the option of "soft-top" guidelines foreclosed by a reversal of Harris,
the only two forms in which the current, complex Guidelines could be
preserved would be the post-Booker advisory system or something like the
House Judiciary Committee's proposal to turn the Sentencing Guidelines into a
system of mandatory minimum sentences. 10 1 Neither option is likely to seem
attractive to the Justice Department. The Department has already expressed its
distaste for advisory guidelines. Transforming the Guidelines into a system of
mandatory minimum sentences would impose O'Connor's "constitutional tax"
in its most onerous form, requiring pleading and proof to a jury of all contested
Guidelines-related facts. While some members of Congress might persist in
their enthusiasm for administering the current Guidelines through jury findings
of fact, it seems likely that reversal of Harris would split the Congress-Justice
Department alliance and send the Department in search of a sentencing model
that would cabin judicial discretion and preserve what it views as an essential
degree of plea-bargaining leverage, but do so at a tolerable procedural cost.
The reversal of Harris by itself might not compel the Justice Department to
consider a materially different successor to the present complex system. For
example, the Department might conclude that its best option after the fall of
Harris would be acceptance of the basic post-Booker advisory Guidelines
98. H.R. 1528, 109th Cong., § 12 (2005); Gonzales Speech, supra note 90.
99. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
100. See, e.g., Bowman, Beyond BandAids, supra note 5, at 53-54; Craig Green,
Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395, 414-29 (2005); see also Margareth Etienne, Into the Briar
Patch? Power Shifts Between Prosecution and Defense After United States v. Booker, 39
VAL. U. L. REv. 741, 745-49 (2005).
101. H.R 1528, § 12.
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framework shored up by some patchwork legislation designed to restore
prosecutorial authority. 10 2 This conclusion might be rendered less likely,
however, by further developments in the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Whatever one may think of its practical consequences, the opinion of the
remedial majority in Booker is doctrinally peculiar. Blakely and the Booker
merits majority say that a judge may not find facts that increase a defendant's
presumptive maximum sentence. Yet the Booker remedial opinion judicially
amends the Sentencing Reform Act to create an "advisory" system in which
judges find facts that generate Guidelines ranges which prove, based on post-
Booker case law, to have something very much like presumptive effect. 10 3 At a
minimum, Booker leaves very unclear the boundary between those facts that
must be found by juries and those that can be found by judges. Implicit in the
Booker remedial holding is the idea that facts found by judges can constrain
judicial sentencing discretion only so much before these facts must be delivered
to the province of the jury. The unanswered question is how much a factual
finding can constrain judicial sentencing discretion without triggering the jury
trial right.
If the Supreme Court answers this question by holding that judges must
have a substantial degree of discretion to deviate from sentencing boundaries
generated by judge-found facts, this holding would have three important
consequences for the federal sentencing debate. First, in the near term, both
Congress and the Justice Department would be more likely to find the post-
Booker advisory regime unsatisfactory because it would require substantial
judicial leeway for departures from the Guidelines. Second, if the Justice
Department wanted greater certainty in sentencing, it would be driven to
alternatives that rely more heavily on jury fact-finding. At the same time, the
constitutional tax imposed by jury fact-finding would generate pressure for a
simpler system that minimizes the number of facts that would have to be pled
and proven at trial. Third, a new system with relatively few hard limits set by
102. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text (presenting proposals to restore
the government's monopoly on substantial assistance departure motions).
103. The Booker remedies opinion left undisturbed 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2005), which
lists the factors a judge must consider in imposing a sentence and includes on that list the
type and length of sentence called for by the Guidelines. Thus, appellate review of the
"reasonableness" of a sentence necessarily includes consideration whether a sentence
conforms to the Guidelines. The weight that should be accorded to the Guidelines sentence
as compared to other § 3553(a) factors remains unresolved. Some courts have held that the
Guidelines should be accorded "heavy weight." See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F.
Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005), reaffid by, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005). Other courts
have said only that sentencing judges must "consider" the Guidelines together with other
factors listed in § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir.
2005). Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined the question, I read Booker and
subsequent lower court opinions to confer something like a presumption of reasonableness
on a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range. See Bowman, Beyond BandAids, supra
note 5, at 30-32 (exploring this point at greater length).
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jury fact-finding might incorporate additional guidelines generated by judicial
fact-finding, but the requirement of significant judicial discretion to deviate
from the Guidelines boundaries would help ensure relative flexibility in a new
system.
2. Contributions from the Sentencing Commission
A well-developed alternative sentencing model incorporating principles of
simplicity and flexibility and aimed at achieving institutional balance is
unlikely to emerge from either Congress or the Justice Department. Congress
lacks the expertise to create such a system. The Justice Department might be
persuaded to endorse it, but would be unlikely to offer anything that was not
markedly, if perhaps understandably, tilted in favor of its own parochial
interests. The proper source for such a plan is the Sentencing Commission.
So far, the Commission has been notably reluctant to advance any proposal
addressing the problems created by Booker. The Commission feels itself under
assault from every quarter, and this sense of isolation and vulnerability may
have made it reluctant to do anything at all. Moreover, the Commission has a
huge institutional investment in the current Guidelines-an investment which
one suspects makes dramatic alteration of the status quo hard to accept.
Nonetheless, significant sentencing reform at this juncture probably cannot
happen unless the Commission, at the very least, espouses the need for change
and ideally takes a leading role in formulating and promoting a new system.
First, the Commission must be convinced that the complexity and rigidity
of the structure it created have led to the dominance of sentencing policy by the
Justice Department and Congress and concomitantly to the Commission's own
increasing marginalization. If the Commission recognizes that a simpler and
more flexible system would not only be substantively better than the existing
Guidelines, but would also in the long run help restore the influence and stature
of the Commission itself by reducing the incentives and occasions for external
micromanagement, that recognition could spur the Commission to creative
action. Second, the judiciary and the Commission should become more closely
aligned. The judges should seek more input into and influence with the
Commission, and the Commission should recognize that its founding vision of
neutral independence from the winds of politics was an unsustainable illusion.
Its formal home and natural ally is the judicial branch, and that alliance should
be fostered to the mutual benefit of both parties.
10 4
104. The task of fostering an alliance between the Sentencing Commission and the
institutional judiciary may be made more difficult if the executive uses the leeway granted
by the Feeney Amendment to reduce the number of judge-commissioners (or even to
eliminate judges from the Commission altogether). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
However, I suspect that the Commission's tradition and the historical association of judges
with sentencing will ensure that judges continue to be appointed to the Commission.
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3. Hopeful auguries of change in the country's mood
The developments outlined above might produce a movement toward a
simpler, less rigid federal sentencing system. However, because simplification
and relaxation would almost surely involve at least a modest reduction in the
severity of federal sentences, the transformation probably cannot be
accomplished without a shift in the perception that longer, tougher, nastier
sentences are always a political good. On the one hand, it seems hard to
imagine that the fever for more punishment would ever abate. On the other
hand, there are indications that a coalition of somewhat unlikely allies may be
slowly generating a consensus that tough, effective law enforcement is not
inconsistent with a more parsimonious employment of prison sentences.
10 5
This nascent alliance of liberal social action groups concerned about over-
incarceration of the downtrodden, libertarian advocacy groups concerned about
the over-criminalization of assertedly private behavior, corporate interest
groups concerned about over-criminalization and over-punishment of business
activity, political conservatives keen to preserve values of federalism against
the perceived over-federalization of essentially local crime, fiscal conservatives
worried about the cost of rising prison populations, judges protective of the
prerogatives of the bench, the defense bar concerned for its clients, and perhaps
even religious activists moved by the biblical imperative that justice be
tempered with mercy may never coalesce as a unified movement. But concern
is rising in enough different quarters that a shift in the political landscape seems
at least possible. This shift is unlikely to become a national cry that every cell
door should be flung open. It may, however, allow legislators to believe they
have the electoral permission of their constituents to be reasonable in their
approach to crime and sentencing policy.
CONCLUSION
James Madison found his way into this Article, not because I have any idea
what he would have thought about the present state of federal sentencing, but
because of his labors to embed two related notions into American political
thinking. First, Madison believed that governments cannot rely on the
persistence of disinterested virtue among any class of officials within
government or class of persons outside of government. Second, because
Madison understood that error, faction, and political self-aggrandizement are
inevitable, he helped to design political structures and align political
institutions in ways that would minimize the ill effects of these human frailties.
Madison's genius lay in creating a system of institutional checks and balances
that, when it works, does not merely checkmate negative impulses but also
105. See Bowman, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values, supra note 7, at 509-
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harnesses the energies of political competitors to produce outcomes both
broadly acceptable and substantively better than any one institution or interest
would be likely to produce on its own.
The federal sentencing system is in trouble because the architects of the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ignored both of
Madison's fundamental insights. The drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act
created a system whose long-term health depended on the enduring wisdom of
a commission of nonpolitical experts possessing no independent political
authority, coupled with a permanent abstention from self-aggrandizing
behavior by the political branches. And the designers of the Guidelines
compounded the problem by creating a system which, through its rigidity and
complexity, facilitated not only repeated intervention in the sentencing process
by the political branches, but also an unhealthy alliance between a Congress
enamored with the electoral benefits of ever more stringent sentencing rules
and a Justice Department equally enamored with the power that manipulation
of such rules provides.
Therefore, a Madisonian reformer confronting the federal time machine
faces a conundrum. The current federal system owes its substantive flaws in
large measure to domination of the rulemaking process by the Congress-Justice
Department alliance. At the same time, the system is deeply entrenched
precisely because the alliance is politically advantageous to both partners. The
reformer would like to reconstruct the system to create a healthier balance of
institutional power, but the reconstruction cannot proceed unless the political
situation can be altered by splitting the Congress-Justice Department alliance
favoring the status quo. I am, at best, guardedly optimistic that the
preconditions for such a split will arise anytime soon. Even if public attitudes
on sentencing are evolving and even if the Sentencing Commission devotes its
considerable talent to devising a better sentencing system, without an alteration
of the constitutional playing field, significant reform seems improbable. Thus,
the Supreme Court is the key player. By overturning Harris and by giving
judicial sentencing discretion constitutional stature, the Court might succeed in
imposing so high a constitutional tax on the sentencing status quo that real
reform would at last seem desirable to the Justice Department and thus, in due
course, to Congress itself. One can at least hope that the Court's future
constitutional sentencing decisions will be informed by a sophisticated
appreciation of the need for a balance of sentencing authority between judges,
legislatures, and the executive.
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